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 NOTES AND DISCUSSIONS 59
 According to Aristotle, Plato in the Republic (at least when describing the com-
 munism of women and children) forgets the tenacity of traditional religious views.20
 In Plato's best city, there will still be murders, abuse, fights, etc. The communism of
 women and children, Aristotle argues in Politics 2.3-4, will not make a city one big,
 happy family. And since the citizens of this city will not know who their real family
 members are, their religious views (which will surely be the traditional ones), com-
 bined with these "impious" actions, will produce fear and shame-and thus distrust
 and alienation-thereby undercutting the unity of the city.21
 ROBERT MAYHEW
 Seton Hall University
 20. In the Laws, a later dialogue generally regarded as less utopian than the Republic, Plato does seem
 to take traditional religious views into consideration. See Laws 868b-869e, 871a-d, and Trevor J. Saun-
 ders, Plato's Penal Code: Tradition, Controversy, and Reform in Greek Penology (Oxford, 1991), 301-4.
 21. I should like to thank Alfonso Gomez-Lobo, Henry Richardson, Gerald Mara, and two anonymous
 referees for their helpful comments and criticisms. Any remaining errors are my own.
 THE SIMILE OF THE TALUS IN CICERO, DE FINIBUS 3.54
 In his discussion of the Stoic doctrine of things indifferent and preferred, Cicero
 has Cato use a simile involving the talus, one of the Roman forms of dice. The Ro-
 mans had two forms of dice, and a game involving either was called an alea. The
 tessera was a cube bearing different marks on each side, as does our modern die, and
 it was thrown in threes. The other form of die was the talus, or knucklebone. The ori-
 ginal talus was the knucklebone of certain animals, and later was made of other ma-
 terial in the same general shape, like the Greek asTpdya7Xo0. The talus was rounded or
 pointed on its two ends, which were unmarked, and marked on the remaining four
 sides, of which two were apparently wider than the other two. The wider two sides
 bore the numbers three and four; the narrower two sides bore the numbers one and six.
 The tali were thrown in groups of four. The best throw, called a Venus,1 revealed four
 different numbers; the worst throw, four of the same. But the point of the simile for
 Cicero's purposes concerns the shape of the talus, not the rules of the game itself. The
 simile is as follows:
 ... ut enim, inquiunt, si hoc fingamus esse quasi finem et ultimum, ita iacere talum, ut
 rectus assistat-qui ita talus erit iactus ut cadat rectus praepositum quiddam habebit ad
 finem, qui aliter, contra, neque tamen illa praepositio tali ad eum, quem dixi, finem per-
 tinebit, sic ea quae sunt praeposita, referuntur illa quidem ad finem, sed ad eius vim na-
 turamque nihil pertinent.2
 ... for it is, they say, as if we imagine that we have, as it were, the goal and end to throw
 the die so that it stands upright-and thus the die which will have been thrown so as to fall
 upright will have a certain preferred inclination towards that end; and the die thrown
 otherwise will have an inclination against that particular end; but nevertheless the pre-
 ferred inclination of the die will not pertain at all to the stated goal of standing upright.
 1. OLD, s.v. "Venus," 2b.
 2. The punctuation of this passage follows that of M. R. Wright in her 1991 edition (Warminster).
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 In the same way those things which are preferred are so called in reference to the desired
 goal, but they have no bearing on the power and essential nature of that goal.3
 The context, once again, is the distinction between things that are good or bad and
 those things that are neither but have some positive value, which Cicero calls prae-
 posita, usually translated as "preferred."
 We will address two principal questions. In what position is Cicero imagining the
 talus to fall and lie? Can this simile shed any light on the problematic relationship
 between the "preferred indifferents" and virtue in the Stoic definition of the Good?
 Some confusion stems from the number of positions that Cicero seems to count.
 He refers to the position rectus assistere, of "standing upright," and that of rectus ca-
 dere, of "falling upright." There also seems to be at least one more position denoted
 by the aliter, contra. There must be only two possible ultimate positions: one is up-
 right, on one of the narrower long sides (numbered one and six), and the other is flat,
 on one of the wider sides (numbered three and four). All other positions are then
 intermediate.
 In fact, Cicero seems to be focusing on only one ultimate position (assistere rectus)
 and two intermediate positions (cadere rectus and aliter). Most translators and com-
 mentators have understood it in this way, at least in part. In his note in the Loeb trans-
 lation, H. A. Rackham says succinctly: "cadere rectus, to alight upright when thrown,
 would be the first stage towards assistere rectus, to remain standing upright."4 The
 intermediate position of landing upright momentarily is designated "falling upright"
 in Cicero's terms, and it is a precursor to the talus standing upright, but it does not
 ensure that it will remain upright. The talus may, and probably will, fall flat.
 Our interpretation sheds new light on Cicero's point regarding the intermediate po-
 sitions of the talus. There are virtually an infinite number of "intermediate positions"
 of the talus as it tumbles through space, but what matters is how it falls. The crucial
 point is that the intermediate positions are essentially different in kind from the ulti-
 mate position. This can easily be grasped by imagining a film of a skittering talus
 that is then cut up frame by frame, each frame representing one intermediate posi-
 tion. We can then clearly see how remote the first bounce in the first frame is from
 the ultimate position in the final frame. Cicero may embed an acknowledgement of
 the nearly innumerable intermediate positions in his laconic aliter, contra. On the
 other hand, Cicero concentrates only on the penultimate position in the words cadere
 rectus, which is the last intermediate position before the talus comes to rest. This pen-
 ultimate position of the talus seems to manifest more of an "inclination" towards the
 goal of standing upright than any of the previous intermediate positions. But the fact
 that the penultimate position is the last intermediate position of the tumbling talus in
 no way distinguishes it from the other intermediate positions in their impermanence.
 The simile underscores the parallel between the impermanence of all of the interme-
 diate positions of the talus, even that of the penultimate position, and the imperma-
 nence of all "indifferents." The "indifferents" need not be saved, since they in no way
 constitute the virtuous life. By their very nature, the "indifferents" have a limited
 duration, can be virtually infinite in number, and can all be lost. In the same way, the
 3. Translations of this passage run the gamut, as one might expect. A little explanatory padding is usually
 necessary to make sense of it. For a particularly concise and incomprehensible translation, see A. A. Long,
 Hellenistic Philosophy2 (California, 1986), 193.
 4. Cicero, De Finibus, Loeb Classical Library (1931), 272.
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 talus can tumble temporarily through virtually numberless positions, and then roll
 onto one side penultimately before ultimately coming to rest permanently on that or
 another side.
 BRIAN S. HOOK AND WILLIAM 0. STEPHENS
 Creighton University
 ACOUSTIC INTRATEXTS IN AENEID 7.122 AND 4.408
 At Dido's banquet Aeneas emphatically re-creates the moment when he and the
 Trojan refugees first caught sight of their new homeland (3.522-24):
 humilemque uidemus
 Italiam. Italiam primus conclamat Achates,
 Italiam laeto socii clamore salutant.
 Servius' comment is right on the mark (ad 3.524): ITALIAM tautologia usus est ad
 exprimendum adfectus navigantium.
 Prominent repetition of the same key word also occurs in Aeneas' attempt to ex-
 plain to Dido his reluctant decision to leave Carthage (4.345-47):
 sed nunc Italiam magnam Gryneus Apollo,
 Italiam Lyciae iussere capessere sortes;
 hic amor, haec patria est.
 After the Trojans have arrived in Italy, Aeneas confirms that their quest is over.
 They have just eaten their "tables," exactly as Anchises (or the Harpies) had predicted
 (7.122-23):
 hic domus, haec patria est. genitor mihi talia namque
 (nunc repeto) Anchises fatorum arcana reliquit.
 The first hemistich of the initial verse is certainly intended to echo the climax of
 Aeneas' attempt at justifying his actions to Dido (4.347): hic amor, haec patria est.
 The second part of the verse introduces the paternal prophecy which certifies that
 the Trojans have arrived at their destined goal. It also contains an acoustic evoca-
 tion of that land itself: mihi TALIA. The juxtaposition of the dative pronoun and the
 substantive-object of the verb is not fortuitous. I suggest that Vergil intended those
 who apply their imagination to the epic text to hear/read Italia-the specific reason
 for Aeneas' confidence.
 A modest measure of support for that suggestion is provided by a verse from
 earlier in the epic. After Dido realizes that Aeneas is about to sail away from Car-
 thage, Vergil addresses an apostrophe to the Queen (4.408): quis tibi tum, Dido, cer-
 nenti talia sensus... ! Again, the immediately adjacent personal dative and its
 substantive-object (cernenti TALIA) yield Italia-the specific reason for Dido's despair.'
 1. Servius' note to 4.408 deserves citation: "Totum hoc magna prosphonesi dictum est: plus enim est
 in re quam in verbis: quamvis enim totum dictum non sit, tamen et cogitatur et capitur ab auditore."
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